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All democratic and totalitarian regimes attempt to coordinate governmental and non-governmental activity in pursuit of putatively common goods; often with little success (Bogdanor, 2005: 2; Hood, 2005).  Joined-up government (JUG) can be seen, says 6, as the ‘eternal and ubiquitous problem in public administration’ (2004:  131), the ‘philosopher’s stone’ (Mulgan, 2005: 187).  Certainly, the recent prominence of JUG in UK and international politics suggests that it is yet to be mastered (e.g. Pollit, 2003).  

This paper argues that political analysis offers new insights into the limits of contemporary JUG.  It contends that joining-up efforts disproportionately emphasize technical, managerial and cultural problems, ignoring the fragmentary effects of persistent value conflict.  The policy and management literatures sometimes acknowledge the challenge of politics for coordination (e.g. Peters, 1998; Ling, 2002), but there remains a lack of theoretical and empirical research exploring the influence of politics on JUG.  

The paper begins to address this lacuna by examining the politics of joining-up through a decentred study of local partnerships in England (Hull) and Scotland (Dundee).  Decentred research is agent-focused, examining actions, beliefs and meanings using methods including observation, conversational interviews and textual analysis (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006).  Following this approach, the study examined the politics of partnership by analyzing respondent understandings of the concepts ‘social exclusion’ and ‘social inclusion’.  It revealed contrasting political conceptions of partnership, which were not openly acknowledged, debated or resolved (Davies, 2007), thereby undermining JUG.  The explanation for this elision was that actors shared a partnership ethos valuing consensus and abjuring conflict.   Drawing from social defence theory (Menzies-Lyth, 1988; Long, 2006) the paper argues that this ethos formed a defence mechanism against anxiety about the prospects of political conflict in partnerships, where it was taboo.  Because political contention was taboo, ‘silo’ practices remained unchallenged within the partnerships, which were thus dysfunctional for joined-up government. The paper concludes that further decentred studies could generate useful insights into the impact of politics on joining-up.  It suggests three hypotheses to inform UK based and comparative research.  

JUG in contemporary politics
The challenge of joining-up government occupies countries as diverse as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway (Christensen and Laegreid, 2006; Wilkins, 2002), South Africa (Harrison, 2006), the UK (Bogdanor, 2005; Pollit, 2003) and the US (Peters, 1998) and is prominent at the European scale (Schout and Jordan, 2005).  The pursuit of governmental coordination maybe ancient (Durose and Rummery, 2006: 315), but contemporary efforts are driven by the dispersal of governmental capacity caused by the New Public Management (NPM) inspired disaggregation of policy making from service delivery (Christensen and Laegreid, 2006; Ling, 2002).  To ameliorate the fragmentary effects of 1980s NPM reforms, governments quickly began looking for ways to suture the system together again.  Christensen and Laegreid (2006: 8) argue that the challenge of JUG became most pressing in countries, like the UK, New Zealand and Australia, which adopted NPM reforms more enthusiastically than others did.  They might have added the new democracy of South Africa, which has also sought ideas about joining-up, from the UK in particular (Harrison, 2006).   

While the national and international scales should not be ignored, it is arguable that the local scale is pivotal to joining-up because it is there that cooperation between state, market and civil society actors is considered most likely to produce coordinated planning and action (Christensen and Laegreid, 2006: 21-2).  The instrument of choice for governments across Europe for the past 15 years has been the growing variety of ‘new social partnerships’.   European structural funds promote cross-sector partnerships at the regional, sub-regional and local levels (Nelson and Zadek, 2000: 13); and for institutions like the World Bank, partnership exemplifies ‘good governance’ in the developing world too (Jessop, 2002).  South Africa’s Integrated Development Planning system is one example, modelled on partnership-led community planning in England and Scotland (Harrision, 2006).   

Arguably, New Labour’s joining-up endeavours stand out from the field.  It is said to have coined the term ‘joined up government’ (Hood, 2005: 24) and maybe more ‘systematic and ambitious’ than predecessors (Bogdanor, 2005: 7) or international peers (Hunt, 2005: 7).  Britain teems with partnerships involving an array of governmental, market and civil society actors (Stoker, 2005).   The prominence of New Labour’s attempts to enhance JUG through local partnerships suggests that a political evaluation of its approach, and the lessons it may hold for others, is overdue.  

Pollit’s depiction of the rationale for JUG is a useful starting point for the discussion: 

‘Joined-up government’ is a phrase which denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontally and vertically co-ordinated thinking and action. Through this co-ordination it is hoped that a number of benefits can be achieved. First, situations in which different policies undermine each other can be eliminated. Second, better use can be made of scarce resources. Third, synergies may be created through the bringing together of different key stakeholders in a particular policy field or network. Fourth, it becomes possible to offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented access to a set of related services (2003: 35). 

Hunt’s (2005: 4) study of Australia, Britain and Canada identifies four modes of joining up: intra-departmental, inter-departmental and inter-governmental processes operate within the public sector, while cross-sector JUG, the coordination of governmental and non-governmental activities, is the fourth level.  The city strategic partnerships discussed in this paper are cross-sector institutions.  There are also many different ways of joining-up, from informal agreements to pooled budgets and organizational mergers.  City strategic partnerships are an intermediate solution, institutionalizing cross-sector cooperation while recognizing the ‘jurisdictional integrity’ of constituent bodies (Skelcher, 2005). 
 
Scholars like Friend (2002), Peters (1998) and 6 (2004), point to the challenge of politics for joined-up government and policy coordination.  For Peters, policy coordination is ‘intensely political’ (see also Ling, 2002).  Says Friend (2006: 275):

Any pathways to strategic progress must recognize the political challenges to be addressed behind the idealistic and apparently simple principle that all agencies – public, private and voluntary – should learn to pursue shared goals in a spirit of partnership.  

Nevertheless, the literature remains silent about the circumstances in which shared goals are, or are not, generated through joining-up processes and with what consequences for coordinated action; surely a pivotal concern for the analysis of JUG.  

New Labour and joined-up local government
JUG is not usually depicted as a panacea and it is generally accepted that well-defined organizational boundaries remain important (Pollit, 2003: 39).  However, joining-up is a powerful telos in government thinking (Allen, 2003), aligned to New Labour’s ‘big tent’ politics (Hay, 1999; Fairclough, 2000; Davies, 2005).  Consensus and one-nation politics are integral to the partnership mechanisms designed to achieve joining-up locally.  Bogdanor (2005: 8) argues that today’s JUG agenda is:

a child of the end of ideology, and of the era of social peace … it presupposes that the various bodies involved in delivering programmes, whether governmental or non-governmental, can be united in their approach, rather than divided by ideology or class interest.

One-nation politics is also age-old, but like JUG, New Labour’s ‘rhetoric of reconciliation’ (Fairclough, 2000: viii) lends it prominence it lacked under Thatcher or Major.  There are many examples of ministers claiming that goals like economic profitability and social justice are now not only compatible but also complementary (Callinicos, 2001: 1).  Blair’s rhetoric is instructive.  Before the 1997 general election, he described New Labour as ‘the political wing of the British people’ (Wheatcroft, 2007: 49), even claiming that ‘New Labour is the political arm of none other than the British people as a whole.  Our values are the same’ (cited in Fairclough, 2000: 47).  At the mundane level of central-local relations, he argued:

Some commentators assert a false dichotomy between national standards and local decentralization. In reality, a strong framework of national standards backed up by enforceable entitlements is an important lever for users and citizens to drive local improvement (Blair, cited in Society Guardian, 2004).

The significance of this rhetoric is not, as some critics suggest, that it proclaims the end of ideology as such (Fairclough, 2000; Powell and Hewitt, 1998) but that it that abjures ideological conflict, which it regards as passé.  Stoker’s (2005) discussion of the Government’s options for local governance illustrates.  He argues that it faces a choice between two modes of multi-level governance.  The first, supported by Stoker (2004), sees the local authority exercising strategic community leadership, with considerable political autonomy and representing communities in the wider partnership context (Stoker, 2005: 162).  The prospects for this model depend on central government recognizing that the joining-up skills of multi-functional local authorities exceed its own (2005: 161).  The second model, constrained discretion, offers decentralized local government management but with central government setting the political agenda, much as it does now (2005: 166). In the strategic leadership model, local democracy is important.  Local government is charged with fomenting debate, encouraging the development of shared aspirations and ensuring that resources are mobilized and coordinated to achieve them.  However, Stoker argues that in addition to conferring formal political freedom and limiting state power, democracy has a third virtue pertinent to the task of joining up; as a vehicle for sharing information ‘relevant to problem solving’ and exploring ‘the range of possible solutions to practical problems’ (2005: 163).  The conception of democracy as problem solving is prominent in Stoker’s heuristic, which identifies key features of the strategic leadership and constrained discretion models.  Importantly, he notes that ‘rituals expressing key values’ are ‘largely absent’ and comments that ‘in terms of emotional attachment and ritual expression both paradigms are underdeveloped’ (2005: 171).  

Stoker’s conception of the strategic choices facing New Labour reinforces the idea that it conceives local JUG in primarily managerial terms, concerned with the ‘technical verification’ of policy impact rather than generating agreement about policy goals (Mathur et al, 2003: 22-3; Skelcher et al, 2005).  His analysis exposes an elision in the government’s approach; both blueprints for local governance seem to be conceived as if obsolete ideological conflicts have disappeared, enabling like-minded partners to get on with the sensible business of problem-solving.  The challenge of generating consensus is overlooked.  






All cities in England and Scotland have strategic partnerships, Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) in Scotland and Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) in England.  Strategic partnerships emerged in the late 1990s as part of the government’s strategy for delivering responsive, coordinated and efficient public services (Johnson and Osborne, 2003; Russell, 2001).  LSPs and CPPs are responsible for formulating a joined-up approach to public service delivery and for meeting social, economic and environmental needs.  They produce community plans, often based on extensive local consultation, which set core priorities for the city.  Their function is then to oversee delivery; all partners are expected to align their own plans with the community plan and work toward specified targets, now formalized in Local Area Agreements (LAAs) between central and local government and other local agencies (DCLG, 2006).  These partnerships sit at the cross-sector end of the scope continuum and in the mid-range of the integration continuum, institutionalizing cooperation while preserving the jurisdictional integrity of constituent bodies (Skelcher, 2005).   

One criticism of the elaborate bureaucracies evolving around strategic partnerships is that they replicate functional and scalar silos.  The government-commissioned national evaluation of LSPs (ODPM, 2006: 42, 51, 52, 105) found that partnerships adopting the popular ‘hub and spokes’ design, a partnership Board supported by thematic sub-partnerships reflecting priorities in the community plan, were not joining-up effectively.  For example, environmental interests might be clustered in one theme group, development interests in another, but with no effective mechanism at Board level to ensure that they pull in the same direction.  Fuller and Davies’s (2005) national evaluation study of LSP economic development activity concluded that ‘[t]he connection between thematic economic partnerships and LSP boards is tenuous’ (2005: 4) and worse that economic partnerships have only ‘a tenuous link’ with economic activity (2005: 22).  

Partnership hierarchies pose a similar problem.  Chief executives and political leaders charged with addressing cross-sector issues and invested with such powers as exist at the local scale to realign spending, sit on partnership boards or high-level management committees.  Middle managers charged with delivering JUG at the coalface typically sit in theme groups further down the partnership hierarchy, where they lack the authority to make decisions about resource allocation.  In addition, partnerships commonly lack mechanisms to ensure that vague collective priorities percolate down organizations, for example from the local authority’s corporate plan to its service plans and further to the front-line.  The fact that ‘depressingly predictable’ community plans often say much the same thing about much the same goals in the same abstract, aspirational language (Pratchett and Leach, 2004: 367) complicates the problem.  Vagueness aggravates the disjuncture between aspiration and action, encouraging competing interpretations of what priorities mean and how to achieve them.  Community plans also ignore whether different priorities are compatible, an elision predicated on reconciliationist politics.  

Strategic partnerships, in which central and local government have invested heavily, offer interesting insights into attempts to join up public agency goals and activities (inter-departmental), the relationship between central and local government (inter-governmental) and the relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors (cross-sector).  The benefits of partnership for joining-up are at one level taken for granted.  JUG is the raison d’être of collaborative politics (Geddes, 2006: 87; Carley, 2006).   Even critics like Rummery (2006: 300), concerned that partnerships lack democratic legitimacy, see them as delivering ‘indirect’ improvements to public services (see also Smith et al, 2006).   

However, many are sceptical about the impact of partnership on JUG.  Percy Smith (2006: 313), for example, argues that there is evidence of good partnership working, but little that it generates desired outcomes.  The literatures on ‘flagship’ New Labour initiatives like LAAs, New Deal for Communities and LSPs are replete with cautionary tales about the impediments to joining-up through partnership (Lawless, 2004; Davies, 2005; Sullivan, 2005).  In a wide-ranging critique, Geddes argues that local agencies lack sufficient autonomy to change budgetary allocations, targets and management practices in a JUG-compatible way.  However (2006: 93):

[w]hile local partnerships are weak in their ability to change the way in which powerful interests and organizations act, they seem much stronger in their ability to restrict local policy and politics within narrow parameters.

The manoeuvrability of local agencies undoubtedly matters for any comprehensive understanding of JUG.  However, Geddes’ claim that partnership imposes weak constraints on organizational behaviour, but strong constraints on politics, begs the question, central to the analysis developed below, of whether there might be a causal relationship: do de-politicized partnerships undermine the joining-up of policy, making joined-up implementation impractical?  This question can be divided into three second-order questions.  What political values motivate partners? Are value conflicts confronted and resolved in the partnership arena?  What are the implications for joining-up if they are not?  To begin answering these questions, the discussion now turns to the study of partnership in Dundee and Hull.  

JUG and the local politics of partnership
The research discussed below formed part of an ESRC study into the local politics of social inclusion undertaken in two coastal cities, Dundee (Scotland) and Hull (Northern England).  Both cities feature prominently in UK government deprivation indices and are a strict test of the JUG agenda.  One objective of the study was to understand better the prevalence and character of consensus within partnerships about the social inclusion agenda.  The politics of partnership are often obscured beneath rhetorical consensus and formal, abstract mission statements (see Fairclough, 2000; Davies, 2007).  To get beyond this gloss, a challenging style of questioning encouraged respondents to engage in critical reflection.  For example, ‘what does the term social inclusion mean to you’?  ‘Is social inclusion always a good thing’?   ‘Can partnership contribute to the creation of a more inclusive society’?  This approach drew respondents into a dialogue that revealed much about the competing political values motivating partners and the impact of a partnership ethos in subsuming these values within a shallow consensus.  

The author conducted 53 interviews between June 2004 and July 2005, 28 in Dundee and 25 in Hull.  Respondents were drawn mainly from local authorities, public agencies and community groups.  They were enlisted from the city strategic partnership CityVision, now renamed the One Hull Partnership, and the East Area Partnership in Hull; and the city strategic Dundee Partnership and the neighbourhood based Social Inclusion Partnership (SIP) in Dundee.  Interview transcripts were analysed with NVIVO.  Since the research began with questions rather than propositions, findings emerged inductively through thematic coding and modelling, following the principles of decentred analysis (Bevir, 2005).  Unsurprisingly, the data was complex and to some extent contradictory.  The analysis below draws out salient themes, which may or may not reflect aggregate or majority beliefs.  Some findings, notably the advance of a technocratic style of partnership management, were expected (Davies, 2007).  An unexpected finding, the focus of this paper, was that the consensual ethos underpinning collaborative politics caused the displacement of known but unspoken value conflicts, which contributed to the persistence of partnership silos.  

Partnership silos and political conflict
Joining-up was widely perceived as a challenge in both Dundee and Hull, although the dialogue was more heated in Hull, which in 2004 was the only city council to be judged ‘poor’ under the government’s Comprehensive Performance Assessment framework .   Many respondents felt that partnerships were internally fragmented, struggling to develop common cause and compatible organizational cultures.  Thus, while partnership was widely viewed as an asset in the cause of social inclusion, the sense across the public, private, voluntary and community sectors in both cities was that it replicated the silos it was created to overcome.   For a public manager in Dundee:

There are too many compartmentalized initiatives, and not enough of integrated strategic thinking.  They will tell you that they're integrated, they will tell you that they tell that person and consult that person, but when you look at the outcomes and you ask them what happened here and what happened there, and you analyse the journey, you find that they went off done what they done ... and you think, well how integrated really is that’?

A senior council manager, reflecting the febrile atmosphere in Hull, commented:  

... so the actual sub-boards of the LSP, whether that's crime and disorder or health, feel absolutely no connection to the LSP and feel even less connection to the community strategy.  There's no performance management, nobody... no organization or no … individual were held to any kind of account for actually delivering outcomes to people.

As argued above, the JUG literature tends to focus on performance management, structure, organizational incentives and cultural recidivism (Johnson and Osborne, 2003; Mathur et al, 2003; Skelcher et al, 2005).  According to another senior council manager from Hull, ‘I think now that it is now probably more about structure than it is about culture, because I think the culture is there that people want this to happen, they want it to work.  It's just that the structure isn't capable or sufficient to make it work’.  

However, the data also revealed persistent value conflicts.  One example, discussed in depth elsewhere (Davies,  2007), was the tendency for community activists and public managers to draw on competing values in defining the purpose of partnership, centred respectively on rights (to a voice) and responsibilities (to contribute).  Most importantly, these conflicts were sublimated in the tacit commonsense values of protagonists and closed to conscious deliberation.  In other words, partners from different social backgrounds failed to understand each other, despite sharing a common vocabulary of ‘social inclusion’.  Moreover, in a partnership environment dominated by technocratic managerialism they could not begin to explore, let alone work through, the unspoken reasons for their political differences.  

Political differences also persisted between public agencies, at the narrower inter-departmental level of joining-up.  The thoughts of a health service manager and a senior council manager in Dundee illustrate.  The health manager suggested that there remained a tension between the ‘bricks and mortar’ regeneration philosophy of leading Council members and officers, ‘if it’s tangible and I can count it, I like it’, and the softer focus on wellbeing s/he associated with services like health, social services and education.  S/he commented of the Council’s approach: ‘it’s very much driven from the economic development guys, because traditionally in Dundee, the social inclusion work was very much a building-based thing’.  S/he continued:
	
…the battle has been … what does social exclusion mean - and does it mean better windows and nicer lamp-posts and new white lighting, or does it actually mean that horrible touchy-feely thing that you don't want to go near, which is about “how do I feel about myself, do I feel happy living and working, do I have a sense of belonging …?”

S/he argued that the political dilemma was whether to ‘put in more money upstream’ or ‘just continue to fish folk out the water down at the estuary instead …’.  However, the senior council officer explained misgivings about this softer approach:  

… the economic development work we've done has suffered because we've had to take on board health and care, community safety, environmental sustainability and these other themes, which in themselves have got a whole series of complex dynamics, so some of the driving work that was being, you know, pushed for very effectively through partnership working and economic development has suddenly found itself competing for energy and for time and for political capital.  

S/he recalled a similar debate about whether agencies should provide services at the neighbourhood scale to promote community engagement, or centrally where resources can be concentrated more effectively in pursuit of strategic goals.  This debate surfaced ‘fundamentally opposing views between agencies and amongst elected members about how to use the resources for best effect’.  S/he accepted that central planning might enable ‘high targets’ to be hit, but thought that this would be at the expense of ‘engaging with the poorest and improving services’.  This debate had revealed that: 

Well actually, poverty doesn't matter to the Health Board; what matters is the rapidity with which you get them through the system …... So, you know, there are some agencies that are not tasked by their national performance indicators to address social inclusion or poverty’.   

The competing values revealed in this ‘exchange’ were widespread.  Asked whether fellow partners would share understandings of the social inclusion agenda, responses were mixed; but most thought that colleagues would differ.  A senior council manager from Hull argued ‘I’m fairly certain they don’t, and that’s no criticism ... definitely we won’t have the same values’.  For example, ‘the three main political parties all talk about choice but the value system behind those words would be very, very different …  how can you measure outcomes if you aren't actually… have an agreement about what… the basis is’?   A leading Hull Councillor thought that there would be ‘ninety percent’ agreement on diagnosis, but ‘I don't think for a minute they have a common view as to how to put it right’.  

These views reflected an acknowledged but unspoken political debate about which interventions, given equal weighting in community planning, to prioritize; for example, income redistribution, physical development or human capital.  The problem of compartmentalization was not therefore uniquely a problem of performance management.  It was also about the politics of interest groups clustered in thematic partnerships.   

A Hull community activist offered an interesting insight into the division of labour in CityVision.  S/he spoke approvingly of thematic partnerships, where relationships between public managers and community activists were better than at Board level.  

But when you get it into the substructure, you're talking a different thing altogether, because whilst the CityVision Board is made up of elected members and senior officers … when you get into the substructure, then it's officers on the ground who are doing a specific piece of work.  

S/he said that these operational managers supporting thematic priorities had a ‘vocation’.  However, what this respondent liked about the thematic partnerships was the very thing that city leaders were struggling to change, but without recognizing or resolving underlying conflicts and so exacerbating fragmentation.  

The partnership ethos and conflict displacement
Previous research by the current author on the politics of urban regeneration, which included a study of partnership in Hull, suggested that there was an emerging ‘logic of partnership’ there; the shared view that partnership had become a necessary, pragmatic response to socioeconomic problems (Davies, 2001, 2002, 2004).  The present study attested to the growing strength of this logic, or partnership ethos.  A public manager in Dundee commented: ‘if you don’t work together … nothing will happen’ and it is a ‘matter of just common sense … to work in partnership’.  Community activists and workers took a similar view.  Said one, ‘it’s critical’: one cannot ‘address social exclusion if you do not work in partnership’.  A senior Council manager concluded ‘you know, it’s fabulous’.  Most respondents in Hull agreed.  Said one senior public manager: ‘no one organization can actually do it on its own’.  A second manager commented: ‘I’m a big believer … I love the concept of the Local Strategic Partnership, because it’s about giving ownership to everybody …’.   Similar views were forthcoming from the Hull Community Network (HCN), representing the community sector on CityVision.  Said one, ‘if you have got a head and you can’t feel your feet, what the hell’s the point’.  

These adages illustrate a commonsense of common interest; the disposition towards reconciliation espoused in third way ideology.  This commonsense, the basis of the partnership ethos, contributes to explaining why political conflicts remained unspoken and, in turn, why thematic silos persisted in the partnership arena.  

The discussion now turns to the specific ways in which the partnership ethos aggravated silo practices: the elision of debate about core concepts and strategic choices and the displacement of political conflicts into apolitical proxy conflicts.  During the fieldwork, CityVision was undergoing restructuring to streamline the partnership.  This exercise included rewriting the Community Plan around a more focused set of priorities.  A council manager cited research showing that the priorities should be crime, employment and learning.  However, reflecting the above discussion, s/he acknowledged that these priorities would not be popular with everyone.  ‘I suppose that’s not what the health colleagues want to hear’ ... but ‘if people have got jobs and money, their health is going to improve’.  Nevertheless, ‘… what I hadn't bargained for was that the interest groups that were lobbying so hard to make sure that their sort of area of influence wasn't left out’.   The manager explained that the then head of the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, Joe Montgomery, had urged CityVision to settle on one or two priorities.   ‘But we actually got three.  And then we were told we had to have a fourth one ... but I still think it lost the focus’.   The inclusion of additional priorities as a concession to lobbying suggests that the partnership was anxious to avoid political confrontation.  It may also explain the perception that it could not prioritize.  Said a business representative on CityVision: 

… partnerships don't tend to be able to prioritize very well because you have all sorts of different partners wanting to say all sorts of different things, sometimes with a lack of understanding about what the agenda is and what the partnership's there for … and ... it ends up being too big.    

The problem of prioritization was, for some, compounded by the vagueness Pratchett and Leach (2004) associate with community planning.  Said a project manager from Dundee, ‘... well, I suppose, in order for it to work properly it has to be quite vague ... it allows different people to interpret it in different ways’.  A manager from the education sector in Hull, asked whether he was conscious of strategic direction from CityVision, said ‘bluntly, no’.  It has ‘always been so strategic as to almost not affect what happens on the ground’.  A voluntary sector manager in Hull commented ‘… it's not explicit active language … a lot of the language seems to be very vague and wishy-washy and not explicit’.  S/he thought that vagueness was necessary ‘because they sort of try to keep it all embracing ...  not too explicit so somebody will take offence at it’.  

Interestingly, Sorensen and Torfing (2005) see vagueness as serving the cause of democracy.  Seeking to establish normative criteria for the inclusive and democratic governance of networks, they argue that because agenda and preference manipulation by elites marginalizes weaker actors, the network agenda must be ‘so broadly and vaguely defined that it is accessible for all the included actors’ (2005: 213).  Yet vagueness, undermining effective performance management, was what both partnerships were fighting against, but through institutional restructuring not open debate.  

Respondents were asked whether partnerships ever debated the meaning of controversial terms like ‘social exclusion’ and ‘social inclusion’.  There was a tendency among the minority who answered ‘yes’ to describe debates around problems like smoking, or the duty on partnerships to be inclusive.    However, the majority in both cities thought that there had been no debate about principles.   By way of illustration, a Council Officer from Hull said:

I don't think we've had the space created to do that deliberately.  I think we feel that we are in a situation where we're given a set of indicators to monitor our progress against...and there isn't ever an opportunity to discuss whether or not that's right or wrong.  It's just we've got to get on and do it.  

A community activist also said that the community representatives were too ‘embroiled in just the fight to make the LSP achieve something’ to think about the meaning of social inclusion.  However, a community worker from Hull thought that CityVision needed ‘a full debate on what do we mean by social exclusion’.   S/he commented: ‘… It should be debating strategic issues facing Hull, and it's not doing that at the moment … it should be looking at some of these big issues facing the city and how can we reverse that’?  A senior council officer from Dundee argued along similar lines:

I think it's very hard to get … conscious reflection into the partnership.  … my experience of Partnership working in Dundee is it's very good. … people do come into it in a kind of pragmatic agency response basis, “this is our agenda, this is what we're trying to achieve, can we collaborate”, it's very open in that sense, a very easy place to partnership work … but it's not particularly reflective or searching in terms of its analysis of the dynamics that are going on within the city.

A colleague, a community regeneration manager, commented: 

…[i]f the discussion moves into some sort of philosophical assessment of what social inclusion is, that doesn't get very far and people are really impatient with it.  So people can deal with the consequential aspects of the discussion on social inclusion but not, not the full concept …

Hence, while these respondents were cognizant of unresolved political conflicts, they tended to avoid them in the partnership arena.   Relatively trivial ‘proxy’ conflicts tended to displace these substantive value conflicts, reflected in comments about the self-serving behaviour of other partners.  The Freudian concept of displacement refers to the subconscious transfer of emotions, ideas or wishes from a forbidden object to an acceptable substitute (see Freud, 2003).  The tendency for some respondents to accuse fellow partners of ‘vested interest’, without naming the real differences between them, may be an example of this.  In Dundee, a project manager said ‘I think you always seem to get the problem of people fighting their corner, you know they always want to keep things to themselves’.   For a community activist,  ‘…I think that a lot of professionals seem to think that … if the community gets too much say it'll do them oot o' jobs but we're no there to take away their jobs, we're there to work with them to try and improve things rather than try to take away their jobs’.  A senior council manager in Hull also thought that ‘to a certain extent partnership working to date has tended to be about vested interest, rather than it's been about what we can achieve collectively together’. And, for a Hull community activist, people ‘don’t like to work together … this paranoia sets in with them that somebody has got something that they haven’t got’.  These comments and others like them were redolent of what Gilbert (2001: 99) called the ‘narcissism of small things’, the displacement of unspoken and in a sense unspeakable conflicts which, if voiced, would threaten the collaborative edifice.  

The analysis can be summarized as follows.  The ‘logic’ of partnership, the consensual ethos governing collaboration, led to the systematic elision and displacement of political conflicts.  However, remaining displaced and unresolved, unspoken conflicts became embedded in the silos symbolized by the hub and spokes model of strategic partnership.  Put another way, the consensus built on the partnership ethos was shallow.  Shallow consensus enabled stakeholders to proceed as if they shared norms, meanings and goals but meant that silo practices remained unchallenged in thematic partnerships, where like-minded actors reinforced them.  While structural reforms might ameliorate the fragmenting effects of self-reinforcing interest group clusters, it is arguable that JUG will remain elusive unless partners can also articulate, debate and resolve value conflicts (Hoggett, 2006).   

Understanding the politics of joining-up
New Labour’s ideological predispositions, performance management techniques and local institutional innovations, have fostered strategic partnerships that privilege the technocratic management of policy at the expense of open debate about values, goals and meanings (e.g. Geddes, 2006).  The study of Dundee and Hull suggests that the elision of political conflict, propagated by these means, contributes to explaining why partnership silos persist.  However, what explains the elision, the maintenance of a shallow consensus through which conflict is ‘intuitively known but “unthought”’ (Long, 2006: 280)?  

Social defence theory (SDT) may cast light on the cognitive mechanisms through which partners perform these elisions.  SDT is an approach in organizational psychology purporting to explain how social systems form a defence against anxiety (Menzies-Lyth, 1988; Long, 2006).  SDT, concerned with ‘the social defenses against the distressing and unbearable emotions aroused by organizational tasks and dynamics’ (Long, 2006: 279), shows how psychological mechanisms facilitate the evasion of anxiety but ‘contribute little to its true modification and reduction’ (Menzie-Lyth, 1988: 77).   According to Long (2006: 293), SDT explains the 

…development and persistence of organizational structures and cultures that sometimes operate more defensively than in pursuit of their primary task. That is, the task is avoided, often because of the distressing and unbearable emotions that it arouses. 

In partnerships that abjure politics and where voicing political difference is seen as cultural recidivism, the prospect of conflict may well provoke anxiety.  This is particularly so given the concomitant top-down pressure on public managers to deliver rapidly improving and ever more efficient public services.  Ahmad and Broussine (2007) document the anxiety experienced by public managers about the perceived loss of personal agency caused by these pressures.  It is easy to see, therefore, that in partnerships where political conflict is taboo, the maintenance of a shallow, abstract consensus might form a defence against similar anxieties (Long, 2006: 281).  Long (2006: 282) uses SDT to explain how the management and workers in a company could be at loggerheads in pay negotiations, but otherwise capable of working productively together.  Similarly, strategic partnerships show actors sharing a nominal consensus at one level being incapable of effective cooperation at another.  The ability of partners, when interviewed, to acknowledge persistent value pluralism was an uncomfortable reminder to them that conflict might not be far away; but rather than confronting it, the partnership ethos subsumed it in trivial proxy conflicts which formed an outlet for stress or, as Long put it ‘unconscious collusions or agreements to distort or deny those aspects of experience that in phantasy give rise to unwanted emotion’ (2006: 288).  In Freudian analysis, repression and neurosis are the price paid for civility (Marquand, 2004: 80).  But according to Menzies-Lyth, organizational dysfunction is the ‘inevitable consequence of the chosen defence system’ (1988: 78).  In Dundee and Hull, the elision of political conflict under the veneer of the partnership ethos simply postponed the political challenge to JUG, at the same time fomenting discontent.  

Hoggett (2006: 175) argues that it is the ‘fate of the public official’ to have to contain unresolved conflicts in society.  This role means that public organizations, not least multi-functional local authorities and partnerships, are places where political conflict must be subsumed, if it cannot be resolved.  Hoggett continues: ‘[w]hat can be observed and confronted are those situations in which members of an organization behave in ways which counter the organization’s agreed purpose, where such agreement has been reached’.  But if true, this is task is doubly challenging in strategic partnerships, organizations composed of other organizations in pursuit of a vague governing agenda.   According to Jaques (1955), the founder of SDT, conflict should be confronted head-on: ‘effective social change is likely to require analysis of the common anxieties and unconscious collusions underlying the social defences determining phantasy social relationships’ (cited in Menzies-Lyth, 1988: 78).   Ahmad and Broussine (2007: 12) make the same point, arguing that ‘if an organization is open to confronting challenges and threats openly, and where emotion-laden questions are discussed openly … the social defence systems are more mature and able to function effectively’.  In this light, the shallow consensus discussed above not only defers the challenge of joining-up it may compound it, acting as a crisis deferral mechanism but allowing tensions to accumulate.  If the prescriptions of SDT were followed through, then partnerships would open up to the idea of confronting political difference; if, that is, they are seen primarily as vehicles for joining up rather than containing political conflict, at which they seem relatively adept, so far (Geddes, 2006).    

Explaining the political limits of JUG
The final step in the argument is to consider explanations for the persistence of value pluralism in the partnership arena and the emergence of the partnership ethos as a social defence mechanism suppressing it.  The analysis developed above is decentred; it describes divergent patterns in the discourses of respondents, flowing from their expression of beliefs and understandings.  Following Bevir and Rhodes (2006), it points to the relevance of ‘tradition’ as a weak form of social structure explaining the persistence of beliefs and practices over time.  Bevir (2005: 22-6) uses the notion of ‘situated agency’ to describe how contingent beliefs and desires are constituted by appeal to the repertoire of theories and traditions available to subjects.  Public sector health and economic development professionals share a public service ethos and both have been accused, historically, of paternalism (Marquand, 2004: 57-61).  However, the accounts from Dundee and Hull suggest that they drew on contrasting traditions in determining their priorities for social inclusion.  The former group was concerned predominantly with influencing externalities such as space, money and the built environment, the latter group with nurturing mind and body; distinct foci which seemed natural and appropriate in virtue of the professions to which actors belonged and which formed a political basis for silos.  

The hub and spokes mode of partnership was itself significant in reinforcing silo working locally.  The thematic architecture created space for the mutual reinforcement of competing values by interest group clusters insulated from external challenge.  Silo practices persisted, therefore, for three reasons: the prevalence of competing traditions comprising distinct political views; the organizational form of partnership, which was dysfunctional for reaching substantive agreement about goals; and the partnership ethos, which allowed actors to displace value conflicts into a shallow consensus around vague goals and proxy conflicts.  

How, then, can the emergence of a partnership ethos itself be explained?  If traditions are enduring, cross-generational phenomena (Rhodes, 2007: 1250), but the partnership ethos is relatively new, then the notion of tradition does not suffice.  A stronger explanation might draw on accounts of how structural and contingent changes in the economy and the power of organized labour allowed the new right to mobilize, gain power and defeat the left in a series of set piece confrontations, notably the 1984-5 miners’ strike.  Defeated in struggle, organized labour, the left in the Labour Party and left local authorities abandoned confrontation and their belief in state-led economic development and made their peace with capital.  After the late 1980s they accepted that growth should be market-led and later that social inclusion should be pursued through a mixture of supply-side enticements to investors, investment in human capital, means-tested benefits and community mobilization (Bevir, 2005: chapter 2).  Many older partners in Dundee and Hull shared painful memories of political defeat and marginalization during the 1980s and saw the partnership big tent, for all its flaws, as progressive (see Davies, 2004; Amin, 2005).  This explanation for the emerging partnership ethos appeals first to an understanding of the structural and contingent conditions in which the left was defeated in the 1980s and second to the contingent political effects of that defeat.  Expectations of class militancy and community radicalism evaporated among demoralized socialists (Gough, 2002: 418), superseded by the ‘new realism’ (Hay, 1999: 1).  Over time, through habituation and as old ideas have faded from memory, what was first a painful necessity has, for many, become a virtue (Davies, 2004: 577) reflected in the prevalent beliefs and dispositions of those sharing today’s partnership ethos.  The emergence of the partnership ethos was thus a contingent adaptation to structural and contingent changes in the world.  Time will tell whether it constitutes an enduring political tradition.  





The study of Dundee and Hull demonstrates that the partnership ethos deflected political conflict, at the expense of joining-up.  This conclusion suggests that politics is central to understanding the limits of joined-up government and that decentred analysis can generate nuanced insights into the politics of JUG.   Decentred analysis may reveal much about whether the conjunction of consensus politics and institutional form found in the strategic partnerships of Dundee and Hull is replicated in other local partnerships or other JUG and policy coordination processes, nationally and internationally.   

There is reason to think that it might be.  Governing by partnership proliferates globally (Geddes, 2005; Jessop, 2002) and, as in the heyday of NPM fragmentation (Common, 1998: 447), other countries look to the UK for insights about how to build effective partnerships (Harrison, 2006).   However, whether international policy convergence around JUG has led to convergent forms, norms and practices remains unknown.   One way of researching this question would be to ask whether a similar partnership ethos has emerged in partnership-oriented countries and if so with what effect on joining-up.  To this end, the methodology deployed in this study could be replicated in exploring the prevalence of value pluralism and its impact on joining-up, vertically, horizontally and cross-nationally.   Decentred analysis is closely associated with interpretivism but it can contribute to both agent and structure centred explanations, revealing much about how actors cope with circumstances not of their own making and generating insights into the day-to-day production and reproduction of political power.  

The discussion points to three hypotheses to inform future research.  The diagnostic hypothesis is that failure to confront political conflict partly explains explain why networks tend to operate in ‘silos’, making what Teisman and Klijn (2002: 197) call ‘self-referential’ organizational decisions.  At the EU level, for example, networks remain sector-focused despite the perceived need for cross-sector joining up (Schout and Jordan, 2005).  Might the explanation for silo practices at the supra-national scale be similar to that suggested for Dundee and Hull at the local level?

The explanatory hypothesis is that the presence of a partnership ethos in any JUG institution or practice will tend to encourage a shallow consensus, the elision of value conflicts and the perpetuation of silos.  Social defence theory (Menzie-Lyth, 1988; Long, 2006) may be useful for understanding the mechanisms by which actors maintain consensus as a means of allaying anxiety about the prospect of conflict in the governing arena.  However, the theoretical and methodological implications of using psychological concepts, like the subconscious, in political explanation require further elucidation.  

The prescriptive hypothesis is that if joining-up is to occur, the political challenge must be acknowledged openly and hard-wired into the institutional mechanisms and cultural practices designed to bring it about.  The challenge of policy coordination is not solvable by eschewing politics for technocratic managerialism.  On the contrary, joined-up politics is a prerequisite for effective managerial coordination.   Joining-up processes, including partnerships, could be reorganized in a variety of ways to meet the challenge of political conflict.  For example, they could be either limited to activities where actors share values at the outset or are capable of developing them quickly; or designed to embrace value pluralism and simultaneously facilitate a discourse oriented toward ‘deep’ consensus, where conflict is welcome but might conceivably be resolved equitably through dialogue.  Agonism, bargaining, negotiation and deliberation might be styles appropriate to this objective (Bacarro, 2006).  

The latter proposition is based on the assumption that recognizing and addressing value conflict might a. lead to more effective joining up, b. be possible and c. be desirable.   However, it cannot be assumed that joining up would follow, even if deep consensus did emerge.  Overemphasized they may be, but the technical, organizational and structural themes in the JUG literature accurately depict significant barriers to joining-up.  Moreover, the three hypotheses trade on assumptions about the merits of joining-up which are not self-evidently true and require justification: particularly if, as Bogdanor suggests (2005: 17), JUG is only intended to be a marginal reform to functional silos.  The predicate of the prescriptive hypothesis is that interest and value conflicts are not as fundamental as to require resolution by force.  However, they might be.  Medearis (2005), for example, argues that because marginal actors often cannot secure an equal say in political decisions through dialogue with governments, it is legitimate for them to use coercive forms of resistance (see also Davies, 2007).  Conversely, as Geddes (2006) intimates, partnerships may have a therapeutic function in damping down social conflict (Chandler, 2000).  Some might see this function as more valuable for social peace than joining-up is for good government.   







This paper draws on research entitled Interpreting the Local Politics of Social Inclusion funded by the ESRC (award RES-000-22-0542).   Thanks to Mark Bevir, Adrian Blau, Kevin Morrell and David Wilson for valuable comments on earlier drafts and to anonymous referees for their constructive suggestions.  Thanks also to Jean Hartley for pointing me towards SDT.
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